The Metaphysics of Social Powers: Individuals, Groups, and Artifacts

February 6-7, 2025

Institute of Philosophy

University of Neuchâtel

Conference description

By applying a dispositional predicate to an entity, we are stating how that entity would behave under certain circumstances. The classic example is that of fragility: by applying the predicate ‘being fragile’ to a glass, we are saying that the glass will break when struck. Some metaphysicians posit the existence of powers as the properties doing the causal work accounting for dispositionality.

The study of powers is well-established in general metaphysics, but it is relatively underexplored in social ontology: is there a possible intersection between these two areas of research? On the one hand, the entities populating the social world seem to wield an array of powers. Some of these exhibit a deontic nature, endowing individuals with the capacity to engage in specific actions, such as the right to elect representatives, or imposing constraints, such as the obligation to pay taxes. Other social powers seem to be causal, giving rise to patterns and regularities investigated by the social sciences. For instance, empirical studies show how social class influences life expectancy, suggesting that higher-level entities like class structures are causally efficacious.

On the other hand, it is unclear whether these are genuine examples of powers as theorized in metaphysics. If deontic powers are not causal, it cannot be argued that they are actual powers. And even for those social powers that appear to be causal, we cannot take for granted that they are actual powers: as social properties are usually taken to be extrinsic properties, it is difficult to claim that they can take part in genuine causal relations.

The application of the metaphysics of powers to artifacts also needs to be explored. Artifacts have powers like natural entities do: being fragile is a property possessed both by naturally occurring entities like ice stalactites and artificial entities like glasses. However, artifacts seem to be the bearers of social powers too. They can be assigned deontic powers, associated with norms concerning their use (e.g. a flag cannot be desecrated). Moreover, artifacts have also been described as social agents, capable of influencing social outcomes through the manifestation of their material powers (e.g. the relation between the use of the contraceptive pill and the sexual liberation of women). Would these features truly qualify as “powers” too?

The goal of this two-day conference is to determine if and to what extent the metaphysics of powers can be applied to social entities and artifacts.

Our keynote speakers will be:

Åsa Burman (Stockholm University)

Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (Lund University)

Tim Juvshik (Middlebury College)

Anne Sophie Meincke (University of Vienna)

Charlotte Witt (University of New Hampshire)

The conference will take place at the University of Neuchâtel on February 6^th and 7^th, 2025.

Call for Abstracts

If you are interested in participating and presenting, please send an abstract (up to 1000 words inclusive of footnotes) to socialpowers.conference@gmail.com by November 17^th, 2024.

Submissions must be accompanied by the author(s)’ name(s), email address(es), and institutional affiliation(s) in the body of the email.

Each speaker will be allocated 40 minutes for presentation followed by 20 minutes for Q&A.

We will notify successful applicants by mid-December.

Some of the questions that can be discussed include, but are not limited to:

• Can the metaphysics of powers be aptly applied to social ontology? Or is the use of the term ‘power’ misleading in social ontology?
• Can we attribute powers to social groups as well as individuals?
• Are social powers extrinsic? Can social powers be intrinsic properties of social groups, systems or structures?
• Are there mind-dependent powers?
• What constitutes a good taxonomy of social powers?
• Is there a distinction between deontic social powers and causal social powers?
• Is there such a thing as social causation, and if so, how does it differ from other kinds of causation?
• Do speech acts have the power to shape social reality? If so, is their contribution constitutive, causal or both?
• Which type(s) of social powers should we ascribe to artifacts?
• Can artifacts possess agency?
• Can we distinguish between natural and artifactual powers? And between artifactual and social powers?
• Can artifactual powers be discovered?

Organizing committee

Francesco Franda, Pauline Souman