List of Contributors:

Wolfgang Prinz
Byron Kaldis
Pierre Jacob
Corrado Sinigaglia
Dan Weisskopf
Nivedita Gangopadhyay
Jennifer Cook
Gottfried Vosgerau
Alex Tillas

Traditionally, cognitive scientists argued for a view of
the mind in which perception, cognition and action were seen as distinct
(classical sandwich).

Recently, this view of the human mind has been questioned
and a call for renegotiation of the relations between input, central processing
and output systems of the mind has been put forth. In particular, proponents of
‘embodiment’ argue that the human body plays a crucial role in cognition, while
proponents of ‘grounded cognition’ argue that cognition is ultimately
analyzable into sensorimotor representations.

The focus of this two-day workshop will be on theoretical
questions related to the ‘grounding cognition thesis’ and the implications
stemming from the claim that sensorimotor representations play a crucial role
in cognition. An attempt will be made to address, amongst others, the following
issues:
• Are sensorimotor representations, and therefore our
abilities to perceive and to move, necessary conditions for cognition?
• Are sensorimotor representations sufficient for
cognition, or a further, possibly amodal code is required?
• Does conceptual thought always have a sensorimotor
counterpart? Do sensorimotor representations play the role of a mere starting
point for cognition, after which the latter becomes independent?
• Do impairments in sensorimotor abilities entail
impairments in cognitive abilities? If so, does the reverse relation hold?
• Does cognition influence sensorimotor perception,
(top-down effects on perception)?